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Abstract 
 
Debate about Germany’s poor economic performance following unification focused on 
supply-side  weaknesses,  and  the  associated  reform  agenda  sought  to  make  low-skill 
labour markets more flexible. We question this diagnosis using three lines of argument. 
First,  effective  restructuring  of  the  supply-side  in  the  core  advanced  industries  was 
carried out by the private sector using institutions of the coordinated economy, including 
unions,  works councils  and  blockholder  owners.  Second,  implementation  of  orthodox 
labour market and welfare state reforms created a flexible labour market at the lower end. 
Third,  low  growth  and  high  unemployment  are  largely  accounted  for  by  persistent 
weakness of domestic aggregate demand, rather than by failure to reform the supply side. 
Strong growth in recent years reflects the successful restructuring of the core economy. 
We  also  suggest  how  changes  in  political  coalitions  allowed  orthodox labour  market 
reforms to be implemented in a consensus political system. 
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For  the  decade  and  a  half  following  German  unification,  Germany’s  economic 
performance was poor. Throughout this period, debate among domestic and international 
analysts and policy-makers (e.g. the German Council of Economic Experts, the European 
Commission and the OECD) focused on the role of labour market rigidities and the need 
for reforms, with the objective of creating labour market flexibility in line with Anglo-
American norms. However, the contours of German performance pose some puzzles for 
this  interpretation.  In  particular,  effective  restructuring  of  the  supply-side  in  the  core 
advanced  industries  has  been  carried  out  by  the  private  sector  using  institutions  of 
Germany’s  coordinated  economy  model,  including  unions,  works  councils  and 
blockholder  owners.  This  indicates  the  continuing  value  of  the  institutions  of  the 
coordinated economy to the private sector in the face of external pressures of increased 
global  competition.  And  we  argue  that  it  helps  explain  Germany’s  strong  external 
performance  since  the  late  1990s.  Second,  orthodox  labour  market  and  welfare  state 
reforms were implemented and created labour market flexibility at the lower end with an 
associated increase in wage dispersion and incidence of low-paid work. The combination 
of these two supply-side developments has sharpened the separation of the labour market 
in  the  advanced  sector  of  the  economy  from the  ‘outsider’ labour market.  Third, the 
presence in Germany until 2005 of low GDP growth and high unemployment at the same 
time as low real wage growth relative to productivity points toward the role of persistent 
domestic aggregate demand weakness and is harder to reconcile with a supply-side causal 
mechanism.  Moreover,  implementation  of  reforms  to  make  the  labour  market  more 
flexible may have interacted with the behaviour of workers with specific skills to increase 
precautionary saving and contributed to depressed domestic demand.  
 
Nevertheless, our alternative hypothesis itself raises puzzles. The first is economic: how 
can aggregate demand shocks account for unemployment outcomes that persist for over a 
decade? The second and third are political economic: if persistent weakness of domestic 
demand was at the core of Germany’s poor performance, what accounts for the absence 
of stabilizing macroeconomic policy? And finally, how did a consensus political system 
as is characteristic of a coordinated economy secure support for labour market reforms 
that are associated with increased inequality and the polarization of the labour market?  
A central problem with assigning an independent role to aggregate demand weakness in 
accounting for German economic performance is highlighted by the widely used New 
Keynesian  macroeconomic model.  In this model, a negative aggregate demand shock 
produces a temporary rise in unemployment and fall in inflation followed by a return to 
the pre-existing constant inflation equilibrium. Thus the observation of persistently high 
and rising unemployment alongside modest and stable inflation suggests deterioration on 
the supply side with no independent role for aggregate demand. However, extending the 
macroeconomic model to the open economy introduces a new channel through which 
aggregate demand shocks can produce persistent effects on unemployment. We suggest 
that  this  open  economy  channel,  which  we  explain  in  Section  2,  provides  a  way  of 
reconciling Germany’s depressed real wage growth with weak growth and employment 
in the context of negative demand shocks. To help illustrate the mechanism, we contrast 
Germany’s experience with that of the UK, where positive demand shocks prevailed in 
this period.   3 
Germany suffered a series of adverse demand shocks including monetary retrenchment in 
1993-4, fulfilment of the Maastricht conditions in 1994-9 and the oil price increase and 
external deflationary pressures of 2004-5. Long-lasting effects of reunification depressed 
growth through the 1990s via both demand and supply effects of the higher burden of 
taxation associated with financing unification and the deep and the protracted contraction 
of  the  German  construction  sector.  German  competitiveness  declined  following 
unification  and  export  market  shares  fell  until  the  latter  part  of  the  1990s.  Unlike  a 
number of other OECD countries including the UK, house prices were stagnant or falling 
throughout the period, which prevented a housing-related consumption boom. In the light 
of these negative shocks to demand, a political economic puzzle is why Germany has 
been  unable  or  reluctant  to  use  stabilization  policies?  One  obvious  answer  is  that 
monetary policy is no longer available under EMU. Why then not use discretionary fiscal 
policy? The complementarities between institutions suggest that at the  economy-wide 
level,  the  presence  of  large  but  non-encompassing  wage-setters  requires  a  non-
discretionary macroeconomic framework in order to create incentives for wage restraint. 
This  may  help  to  explain  the  absence  of  a  stabilizing  macroeconomic  response  in 
Germany in the face of persistently weak domestic aggregate demand especially in the 
post-2000  period:  recovery  from  the  end  of  2004  rested  entirely  on  the  strength  of 
external demand. 
 
The second political economic puzzle stems from the consensus German political system 
and its relationship to the wage-setting institutions and vocational training arrangements. 
The heavy reliance of firms on deep firm- and sector-specific skills creates a role for 
union wage-setters located outside the firm. Union wage-setters are able to curtail the 
exercise of bargaining power by skilled insiders who would otherwise be able to extract 
rents from the firm with excessive wage demands. In turn, if workers are to invest in 
these co-specific assets, the welfare state has to provide adequate insurance in the event 
of  job  loss  due  to  company  failure  (Iversen,  2005).  This  brings  in  the  nature  of  the 
political  system  since  the  long-term  character  of  the  investments  requires  that 
institutional change be difficult and require wide agreement. Thus a consensus political 
system complements the other coordinated economy institutions. The framework of the 
Varieties of Capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001) literature with its emphasis on such 
complementarities faces a challenge in accounting for the introduction in Germany of 
wide-ranging  reforms  of  the  welfare  state  weakening  protective  labour  market 
institutions. The specific characteristics of German partisanship and union structure have 
been  proposed  as  ways  of  accounting  for  the  inegalitarian  character  of  the  reforms 
implemented, and the reshaping of political coalitions which this has required.  
 
In Section 1, we focus on the evolution of the supply side in Germany looking both at 
how the private sector used the institutions of the coordinated economy to undertake 
restructuring,  and  at  government-led  reforms  designed  to  increase  labour  market 
flexibility. In Section 2, we compare the extended growth recession in Germany with the 
long recession-free boom in the UK. This allows us to illustrate how contrasting patterns 
of aggregate demand – positive shocks in the UK case and negative ones in the German 
case  –  are  consistent  with  the  divergent  outcomes  in  unemployment  and  real  wages 
observed.  The  role  of  the  open  economy  channel  is  reflected  in  real  exchange  rate   4 
appreciation in the UK and real depreciation in Germany. We also draw attention to the 
likely  difference  in  the  macroeconomic  effects  of  a  restructuring  process  focused  on 
reducing relative unit labour costs in a large economy like Germany as compared with a 
small open economy (such as the Netherlands). In Section 3, we turn to the political 
economic  arguments,  looking  first  at  why  German  institutions  may  be  especially  ill-
suited to the use of discretionary macroeconomic policy and second, at how changes in 
political coalitions in Germany made possible the implementation in a consensus political 
system of reforms that weaken protective labour market institutions.  
 
1. The supply side in Germany: private sector restructuring and government 
reforms 
In spite of the emphasis on supply-side failure in much analysis of Germany’s economic 
woes,  there  is  evidence  of  robust  restructuring  in  the  core  advanced  sector  of  the 
economy and of the effects of labour market reforms in the ‘outsider’ labour market. 
Indeed, the functioning of the German labour market has changed substantially over the 
post-unification period. The outcome of the combined pressures from increased global 
competition  in  product  and  financial  markets  with  deregulatory  reforms  produced  a 
shrinkage of the insider labour market and a widening gap in wages and employment 
conditions between insider and outsider labour markets.  
In the private sector, the insider labour market refers to employees in manufacturing, 
finance,  insurance,  and  business  services,  in  large  firms,  and  on  full-time  permanent 
contracts. One indicator of the increased segmentation that has occurred is that whereas 
the prevalence of low-wage work among full-time employees in the core sectors hardly 
changed from 1995-2003, it increased sharply in smaller firms, in sectors outside the 
core,  and  in  those  affected  by  privatization  (such  as  infrastructure  and  transport)  or 
subject to competition from ‘posted’ workers from other EU countries employed under 
the home country’s employment conditions (such as construction) (Bosch and Kalina, 
2008, Table 1.6). A second indicator is the prevalence of temporary work. Among men, 
the change has taken Germany from below the EU-15 average in 1995 to above it a 
decade later. In 1995 the proportion of employees in temporary work was 9.9% (10.6% in 
the EU-15) and rose to 14.3% (14.0% in the EU-15) by 2005 (OECD.Stat; Labour Force 
Statistics, 2008).  
 
Supply-side restructuring – the private sector and coordinated economy institutions 
We  suggest  that  the  very  different  type  of  labour  market  and  skill  organisation  in 
Germany  in  comparison  to  the  UK  and  the  US  has  played  an  important  part  in  the 
conduct of private sector-led restructuring of the past decade in Germany and may also 
help account for cross-country differences in consumption behaviour that came to the 
fore and that are discussed in Section 2. Of central importance in the argument is the 
vocational training system in which companies play a leading role, and in which young 
workers acquire relatively deep skills specific to a sector and to a considerable extent to a 
firm.  Among  full-time  workers  in  Germany  in  2003,  three-quarters  had  a  vocational 
qualification, 11% a college or university degree and 13% were unskilled (Bosch and 
Kalina, 2008, Table 1.2, p. 32). By contrast, the UK and the US place far more emphasis   5 
on general education and training with a correspondingly lower share of vocationally 
qualified workers and higher shares of both tertiary and unskilled workers.  
 
Recent analysis using linked employee-employer data for 1997-2002 provides evidence 
that the German apprenticeship system is able to create incentives for companies to invest 
in  human  capital  by  providing  costly  general  and  occupation-specific  skills  in 
manufacturing and other sectors where deep company and industry skills are required. In 
sectors where training is costly for the training firms, post-training wage compression, 
and  a  thin  outside  labour  market  enhance  the  value  of  the  match  between  training 
company and employee, allowing the investment to be recouped. In occupations where 
skills are more general and mobility is higher, the provision of apprenticeships is cost-
neutral for training firms (Mohrenweiser and Zwick, 2008). In the past, such ‘lower tier’ 
apprenticeships – often in small firms – were the route to semi-skilled employment in the 
insider labour market (Soskice, 1994). One of the key questions for research is how the 
restructuring of the labour market has affected the employment outcomes of workers with 
these qualifications and how it will feed into the incentives for children in the education 
system.  The  depth  of  skills  across  the  German  work-force  that  arise  from  the 
apprenticeship  system  is  illustrated  by  cross-country  comparisons  of  labour  quality. 
Estimates at industry level for the year 2000 comparing Germany, the US, the UK and 
France show Germany ranked first in all but 12 of the 68 industries (Mason et al., 2007).   
The restructuring of the economy connected to the core labour system has been extensive 
and successful.  Moreover, this has been  carried out by  private sector  agents (unions, 
employers’ associations, firms, works councils) without a direct role for the government. 
Restructuring  has  entailed  increased  consensus-based  decision  making  in  firms  with 
works council chairs playing a greater role in co-management (e.g. Höpner, 2003). The 
median (i.e. skilled) employee interest has become increasingly aligned with the firm’s. 
Whilst  industry  unions  still  play  a  major  role  in  coordinated  wage  bargaining  and 
vocational training, both have become more oriented to company needs (Thelen, 2007, 
Addison et al., 2007). Industry unions are more dominated than in the past by major 
works  council  chairs  and  in  industries  that  are  less  unionized  (e.g.  banking  and 
insurance), works councils have also played an important  role in the restructuring of 
advanced service sector companies. 
Key changes since the early 1990s include the collapse of coordinated bargaining in East 
Germany, where the attempt to reproduce the core German model largely failed. In West 
Germany smaller firms tended to leave the formal wage-setting system but small firm 
associations emerged to shadow coordinated wage bargaining since the reasons for not 
wanting  internal  firm-level  wage-setting  prevail.  Union  membership  density  (as  a 
percentage of employees) fell from 32% in 1980 to 23% in 2004 (in West Germany; 18% 
in East Germany). However, although coverage declined as well, in 2004 it was still the 
case that 68% of employees in West Germany and 53% in the East were covered by 
collective  agreements  and  that  for  about  one-half  of  those  not  covered,  the  sectoral 
agreement was the point of reference for wage-setting (Addison et al., 2007). There was 
also a shift in a range of tariff-related bargaining areas from union to company works 
council level (e.g. part-time working for older workers) negotiated with the unions and 
with input from works councils.    6 
Average  job  tenure  appears  not  to  have  fallen,  which  suggests  that  companies  have 
focused on internal restructuring and the flexible redeployment of workers facilitated by 
the new occupational profiles and flexible working times negotiated with unions (Bosch 
and Kalina, 2008). An important mechanism for internal restructuring has been company-
level  pacts  for  employment  and  competitiveness  (betriebliche  Bündnisse  zur 
Beschäftigungs- und Wettbewerbssicherung). Hassel and Rehder (2001) document such 
pacts in just under half of the largest 120 German companies. They were of three types: 
in  the  first,  the  objective  was  to  redistribute  work  among  employees.  This  entailed 
concessions from employees on the extent and flexibility of working hours and on labour 
mobility in exchange for guarantees of employment security and vocational training from 
employers.  In  the  second  type,  wage  concessions  were  granted  in  exchange  for 
employment  security  and  investment  and  in  the  third  kind,  productivity  gains  were 
secured by worker concessions on working hours, reductions in absenteeism and work 
reorganization in exchange for employer commitments on investment. Hassel and Rehder 
report that in only 10% of the companies, were the unions not involved in some way in 
the negotiations.  
In the model of a coordinated economy, blockholder owners play a role both in allowing 
long-run relationships between workers and the firm to be sustained and in facilitating the 
monitoring of performance within the firm. Neither worker nor manager performance in 
these  activities  is  easily  evaluated  in  external  markets  and  skilled  workers  need 
mechanisms to ensure that their investments in acquiring new competences will not be 
undermined  by  radical  changes  in  asset  use.  The  globalization  of  financial  markets 
expanded the opportunities for owners of capital and increased the rate of return required 
by shareholders, putting pressure on companies to deliver ‘shareholder value’. However, 
it  appears  that  the  blockholder  ownership  pattern  has  remained  largely  in  place  in 
Germany through this period of restructuring. New institutional owners have emerged but 
typically as minority holders. Management and works councils chairs were able to make 
use  of  the  new  institutional  investors  when  they  needed  to  apply  pressure  for  the 
restructuring of companies.  
 
Although  the  available  data  is  fragmentary,  a  number  of  sources  of  evidence  –  on 
ownership, the presence of different kinds of institutional investors and the nature of 
changes in corporate governance at company level – support the hypothesis that under the 
pressure of the global integration of financial markets, Germany developed differently 
along  these  dimensions  than  Italy  or  France,  and remains  very  distinct  from the  UK 
(Carlin, 2007).
2 One indicator of the continued importance of blockholders is that the 
proportion  of  market  capitalization  owned  by  non-financial  companies  increased  in 
Germany from 37% in 1996 to 43% in 2004 and the share owned by financial institutions 
                                                 
2 In Italy, control structures adapted to far-reaching changes in regulation in a way that reproduced pre-
existing control patterns (e.g. pyramids were replaced by shareholder coalitions) and protected incumbents 
from the growing threat of international competition. Corporate sector performance was poor. In France, 
there is evidence of transition toward a different institutional cluster: changes in regulation led to the 
replacement  of  blockholder  arrangements  by  the  greater  engagement  of  activist  institutional  investors, 
including those from abroad (Carlin, 2007).   7 
declined from 21% to 15%.
3 An analysis of voting blocks in German listed firms showed 
stability in the core companies and core sectors of the economy, with a modest move 
toward somewhat smaller blockholder stakes in firms (mainly in ‘new economy’ sectors) 
present  in  2003  but  not  in  1997.  In  Germany  like  France,  changes  in  governance 
standards toward greater transparency led to greater engagement of foreign and domestic 
institutional investors. However in Germany, such involvement appears to have been of a 
more passive kind: investors who were largely content with existing management and 
control  arrangements  sought  to  take  advantage  of  opportunities  for  portfolio 
diversification,  rather  than  taking  stakes  to  gain  active  control.  Goyer  (2006,  2007) 
argued that foreign pension funds acquired small stakes in large firms in both France and 
Germany as part of their diversification strategies but that a clear difference in preference 
for stakes in French versus German firms could be observed in the case of mutual and 
hedge funds. The argument is that the latter favoured investment in France over Germany 
because  of  the  greater  unilateral  control  by  top  management  in  French  firms,  where 
works  council  involvement  is  absent.  The  changes  in  corporate  governance  and  the 
functioning of the block-holder system in Germany fit the broader picture of restructuring 
from ‘below’ or ‘inside’, with government reforms having only a limited effect on how 
the core economy functions.  
 
An  important  dimension  of  private  sector  restructuring  by  German  companies  has 
involved  the  reorganization  of  their  production  processes  to  make  use  of  new 
opportunities for the sourcing of inputs from abroad. The rapid emergence of competitive 
locations for the supply of goods and services in Asia and in the transition economies of 
Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s offered opportunities for German companies to 
improve their profitability. In tandem with the renegotiation of working practices and 
remuneration  schemes  at  home  using  pacts  for  employment  and  competitiveness, 
operations abroad were expanded. A detailed exploration of the employment effects of 
the  activities  of  German  multi-national  companies  for  1999-2001  shows  that  those 
companies that expanded employment in their foreign affiliates retained more workers at 
home  than  otherwise  similar  German  firms  that  did  not  expand  employment  abroad 
(Becker and  Muendler,  2008).  Since  the  expansion  of  foreign  activities is integral  to 
globalization, this test is much more informative about the impact of outsourcing on firm 
behaviour and employment than studies that look at the substitutability between home 
and foreign workers, holding output constant. Becker and Muendler found that German 
firms expanding their activities abroad (in any foreign location) had higher retention rates 
(than firms that did not expand) for workers with high and low education levels and in 
both blue and white collar jobs. The differential retention effect was especially marked 
for workers with tertiary education. In econometric analysis using macroeconomic data, 
the Bundesbank (2006) reported that outward German FDI is associated with increased 
domestic investment and positive employment effects.  
 
Reflecting the success of private sector restructuring was the behaviour of profitability in 
German  industry  and  the  performance  of  the  tradeables  sector.  The  profitability  of 
German firms improved and this is illustrated in the national accounts data where the net 
                                                 
3 The corresponding figures for France are a fall in the share held by non-financial companies from 29% to 
16% and a rise in the share held by financial institutions from 25% to 40% (Carlin, 2007).   8 
profit share staged a very impressive recovery (Fig. 1). The deep disruption to the private 
sector of the German economy caused by unification was overcome. The recovery since 
the mid 1990s contrasts with that in the 1980s. In the earlier episode, the recovery in 
business profitability was driven by the non-manufacturing sector whereas following its 
collapse  after  unification,  the  profit  share  in  manufacturing  has  increased  to  levels 
recorded in the late 1980s boom. This is likely in part to reflect the greater opportunities 
afforded by outsourcing in the more recent period. 
 
Figure 1. Long-run Behaviour of Net Profit Shares (NPS) in the Business Sector and in 
Manufacturing, Germany 1950-2005 (percent) 
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Source: Calculated from Statistisches Bundesamt (2008). Corrected for self-employment. The business 
sector is private, non-agricultural business excluding the rental sector.  
Notes: The data from 1991 refer to unified Germany. However, the break in the series for the business 
sector is mainly accounted for by changes in national accounts methodology. 
 
The  success  of  restructuring  from  the  mid  1990s  is  reflected  in  German  export 
performance. During the period when China, India and the former communist countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union entered world markets, the 
export performance of most OECD countries deteriorated. They lost market share to the 
new  entrants.  Germany’s  performance  was  counter  to  this  trend:  as  Fig.  2  shows, 
Germany’s export performance in goods and services improved over the decade to 2006 
(See Fig. 2). In an econometric analysis of the determinants of export performance 2001-
2004  in  France,  Germany,  Italy  and  Spain,  the  authors  conclude  that  ‘Germany’s 
relatively vibrant recent export performance is consistent with its comparative strength on   9 
price and cost competitiveness and global demand for its products’ (Allard et al., 2005 p. 
4).  In  contrast  to  the  other  countries  there  was  also  a  positive  growth  of  exports, 
unexplained by the traditional determinants of domestic and foreign demand and cost and 
price competitiveness.
4 
 
Figure 2. Export Performance of OECD Economics, 1995-2006 
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Source: OECD Economic Outlook 83 Annex Table 44.  
Notes: This is the cumulated OECD measure of the change in export performance (export volume divided 
by total exports of goods and services).  
 
Supply-side restructuring – government labour market & welfare state reforms 
The long period of high unemployment in Germany, which we argue in the next section 
was largely an aggregate demand phenomenon, prompted welfare state and labour market 
reforms  of  the  traditional  kind  (beginning  in  the  mid  1990s  and  culminating  in  the 
extensive Hartz reforms from 2003 onwards). Table 1 reports OECD data on the intensity 
of labour market and welfare state reforms undertaken, bench-marked against the OECD 
recommendations:  Germany  ranked  fourth  highest  of  thirty  OECD  countries  in  this 
measure of reform effort for the 1994-2004 period. The reform intensity of the UK during 
this period is shown for comparative purposes. 
                                                 
4 This is consistent with the positive trend in export market share controlling for cost competitiveness for 
Germany identified by Carlin et al., (2001) for the earlier period, 1970-1992.   10 
Table 1. The intensity of OECD-recommended labour market and welfare state reforms 
undertaken between 1994 and 2004  
 
A. 
 
  Overall score  Rank  (out  of  30 
OECD countries) 
Germany  23.9  4 
UK  16.7  11 
 
B. 
  EPL  Unemp. 
Benefits 
Working 
time 
flexibility 
Early 
Retirement 
Wage 
formation 
& 
industrial 
relations 
ALMP  Taxes 
& 
social 
security 
Germany   16.7  19.2  16.7  25.0  9.1  57.7  12.5 
UK  -10.0  11.5  0.0  25.0  -9.1  50.0  56.3 
 
Source: Brandt et al., (2005). Table 8, p. 56.  
Notes:  The  score  relates  to  the  number  of  actions  taken.  Measures  introduced  contrary  to  the 
recommendations of the OECD Jobs Study are scored with a negative number (e.g. the introduction of the 
minimum wage in the UK was scored negatively in ‘Wage formation’). EPL – employment protection 
legislation;  ALMP – Active Labour Market Policies. More detail is available in the Appendix of Carlin 
and Soskice (2007a, b).  
 
Evidence from a number of data sources confirms that the incidence of low-paid work
5 in 
Germany began to increase in the mid 1990s (Bosch and Kalina, 2008). For example, 
among  full-time  workers  incidence  began  to  rise  from 1995  in  West  Germany  (after 
declining from 1980-1993). By 2003, 17.3% of full-time employees in West Germany 
and nearly one-fifth in East Germany received less than two-thirds of West (resp. East) 
German median earnings. Internationally comparative data in a 6-country study show the 
incidence of low pay in 2005 varying widely from 8.5% in Denmark and 11.2% in France 
to 17.6% in the Netherlands, 21.7% in the UK, 22.0 % in Germany, and 25% in the US 
(Mason et al. 2008).
6  
One effect of the reforms has been to leave particular groups such as the low skilled, 
immigrants  and  East  Germans  outside  the  generous  German  welfare  state,  whilst 
employees in the core labour system are still relatively protected. Inequality at the bottom 
of  the  wage  distribution  increased  as  collective  bargaining  ceased  to  cover  them 
(Dustmann et al., 2007), and household poverty has increased (Förster and Mira d’Ercole, 
2005). At the same time it appears that the children of those in the outsider labour market 
may be increasingly excluded from entry to the core labour system via the vocational 
                                                 
5  ‘Low  pay’  is  defined  as  gross  hourly  earnings  below  two-thirds  of  the  median  hourly  wage  for  all 
employees. 
6 Updated to 2005 by Geoff Mason. If East and West Germany are treated together, the low pay incidence 
is 22.7%.   11 
training system, an outcome reinforced by the worsening performance of children in the 
lowest secondary school track (Bosch and Kalina, 2008). Meanwhile, the core labour 
system  was  characterized  by  continuity  in  institutional  arrangements  combined  with 
effective restructuring by private agents. Restructuring in the core economy and reforms 
affecting the outsider labour market combined to depress real wage growth. We turn in 
Section 2 to the relationship between the behaviour of real wages and unemployment. 
 
2. Aggregate demand and persistent unemployment 
 
According  to  standard  New  Keynesian  macroeconomic  models,  a  sustained  fall  in 
unemployment without inflationary consequences must reflect supply-side improvements 
either  via reforms  or as  a  consequence  of unanticipated  positive  productivity  shocks. 
Conversely,  persistently  rising  unemployment  without  continuously  falling  inflation 
suggests a worsening of supply-side conditions. In such models, aggregate demand plays 
a passive role in accounting for longer term changes in unemployment. Since only the 
supply-side determined equilibrium rate of unemployment is sustainable, fluctuations in 
aggregate  demand  either  account  for  temporary  deviations  of  the  economy  from  the 
equilibrium or track the path of the economy to a new equilibrium following a supply 
side shift. For example, if supply side conditions have deteriorated but the downward 
adjustment of private sector aggregate demand is sluggish, the macroeconomic policy 
reaction  functions  will  respond  to  the  upward  pressure  on  inflation  and  signal  the 
necessary policy change to ensure stabilization of aggregate demand around a new higher 
unemployment equilibrium.  
 
There  is  a  sharp  contrast  between  British  and  German  economic  performance  in  the 
period following the unification shock in Germany and the UK’s exit from the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism. The British economy grew on average by more than one percentage 
point  per  year  faster  than  Germany,  its  unemployment  rate  declined  more  or  less 
continuously and its public debt shrank. German unemployment and public debt rose. 
The standard macroeconomic framework suggests that these differences reflect supply-
side phenomena. However, Section 1 presented a prima facie case for the presence of 
supply-side  improvements  in  Germany  over  this  period:  restructuring  by  the  private 
sector  of  the  export-oriented  part  of  the  economy,  encapsulated  by  the  recovery  of 
profitability, together with the implementation of prescribed supply-side reforms. Indeed, 
applying the results of widely cited cross-country empirical studies of the determinants of 
cross-country unemployment performance to Germany (e.g. the panel data analysis of 
Bassanini and Duval, 2006) predicts that German unemployment should have fallen, not 
risen over this period. The Bassanini-Duval results predict a fall in unemployment in 
Germany  of  1.6%  points  from  1993-2003  due  to  supply-side  changes,  when 
unemployment increased by 1.4% points; for the UK, one-half of the actual fall was 
predicted by supply-side changes.
7  
 
                                                 
7 Using the base-line linear regression in Bassanini and Duval (2006) and ignoring the variables with 
insignificant coefficients (union density and employment protection legislation).    12 
In this section, we point to three mechanisms through which the aggregate demand-side 
may help to account for the contrasting performance of Germany and the UK over the 
last  decade.  The  first  relates  to  the  impact  of  aggregate  demand  shocks  on  the  real 
exchange rate; the second focuses on the way that specific labour market institutions 
characteristic of Germany may interact with reforms to raise precautionary savings; and 
the third explores how wage restraint arising from the private sector restructuring and 
government  reforms  detailed  in  Section  1  may  depress  aggregate  demand  in  a  large 
economy. 
 
Long-lasting aggregate demand effects in the open economy 
One response to the ostensible failure of the standard New Keynesian model to explain 
the performance of the UK and Germany, is to extend the model to allow for long-lasting 
aggregate demand effects. This can be done by opening the economy and allowing for a 
causal  effect  of  aggregate  demand  shocks  on  the  real  exchange  rate  and  hence  on 
medium-run  unemployment.  Central  to  the  standard  model  is  a  negative  relationship 
between the unemployment rate and the real consumption wage reflecting the behaviour 
of  wage-setters.  From  the  perspective  of  wage-setters,  a  lower  unemployment  rate  is 
consistent with stable inflation only when the real wage is higher (given the disutility of 
work).  However,  from  the  perspective  of  price-setters,  a  higher  real  wage  is  not 
compatible  with  an  expansion  of  employment:  for  example,  assuming  constant 
productivity,  price-setters require an unchanged real wage to deliver their required profit 
margin at higher employment. Thus the constant inflation rate of unemployment in the 
closed economy is completely pinned down by supply side conditions. However in an 
open  economy,  the  resources  to  make  a  higher  real  consumption  real  wage  at  lower 
unemployment compatible with an unchanged real product wage are potentially available 
from abroad through an appreciation of the real exchange rate. This lowers the real cost 
of imported goods and thereby boosts real consumption wages.  
 
The next step in the argument is to connect shifts in aggregate demand to changes in the 
real  exchange  rate  and  the  real  wage.  The  open  economy  model  assumes  that  firms 
produce  differentiated  goods  that  are  sold  in  imperfectly  competitive  markets.  Fig.  3 
illustrates the case of an adverse aggregate demand shock. A lower level of aggregate 
demand reduces domestic output and raises unemployment (the move from point A to 
point B′). As a result, wage inflation falls relative to world inflation, the real exchange 
rate depreciates, worsening the terms of trade, and real consumption wages fall (point B). 
The higher real cost of imports allows a lower real consumption wage to prevail at a 
supply-side equilibrium with lower output and higher unemployment.
8 Therefore shifts in 
aggregate demand, if they are persistent, can move the economy to new constant inflation 
unemployment rates. If there is a period of sustained weakness in aggregate demand, 
unemployment rises but inflation ceases to fall once real consumption wages have fallen 
to a level consistent with wage-setters’ behaviour at higher unemployment (point B in 
Fig.  3).  Conversely,  in  the  case  of  a  positive  aggregate  demand  shock,  in  the  open 
economy  the  closed  economy  mechanism  through  which  rising  inflation  at  lower 
unemployment leads the central bank to raise the interest rate and induce contraction 
                                                 
8 This mechanism is described in Carlin and Soskice (1990, 2006), Layard et al., (1991) and is also found 
in new open economy models such as Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) and Gali and Monacelli (2005).   13 
back to the original unemployment rate is circumvented by the fact that real consumption 
wages can rise.  
 
Figure 3. Open Economy Model: Adverse Demand Shock 
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This argument stresses that shifts in aggregate demand can cause changes in the real 
exchange  rate  and  hence  in  the  constant  inflation  unemployment  rate,  rather  than 
assuming  them  to  be  exogenous  shocks  as  in  much  of  the  empirical  literature  that 
estimates NAIRUs (e.g. Batini and Greenslade, 2006 for the UK and Fitzenberger et al., 
2007 for Germany). Estimates of time-varying constant inflation unemployment rates for 
the UK suggest that the appreciation of sterling and associated fall in real import prices 
from 1997 allowed unemployment to fall below the long term NAIRU (defined as the 
constant  inflation  unemployment  rate  determined  solely  by  the  supply-side)  without 
accompanying inflationary pressure: “there was a lot of running room for unemployment 
to decline before giving rise to inflationary pressures” (Batini and Greenslade, 2006, p. 
39). For Germany, Fitzenberger et al. (2007) estimate a time-varying NAIRU and find no 
evidence that it increased after the early 1990s. In accord with Batini and Greenslade, 
they report a significant effect on the NAIRU of the price wedge between the CPI and 
GDP deflators. 
 
Fig. 4 presents data for the UK and Germany for the period from 1993. The left hand 
chart  shows  unemployment  and  CPI  inflation  performance:  the  limited  difference 
between the countries in inflation and the contrast in unemployment are clear. The right 
hand chart provides data on labour productivity and real wage growth. After 1995, real 
wage growth in terms of consumer prices in the two countries diverges dramatically:   14 
rising in the UK and falling in Germany. Productivity growth differences are much more 
muted:  German  productivity  growth  is  always  above  real  wage  growth,  whereas  the 
opposite is the case for the UK from 1996.  
 
Figure 4. Comparative data for Germany and the UK: Unemployment, Inflation, Real 
Wage and Productivity Growth 
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Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database, 82. 
Notes: Unemployment is the OECD standardized rate (%); Inflation is CPI (% p.a.); Real wage growth is 
compensation  per  employee  in  the  private  sector  deflated  by  the  CPI  (%  p.a.);  Productivity  is  labour 
productivity (employment basis) (% p.a.). Inflation, real wage and productivity growth series are 3-year 
moving averages. 
 
We turn now to examine whether the evolution of real exchange rates was consistent with 
shifts in aggregate demand in these economies having played a major role in accounting 
for the behaviour of unemployment. In the case of Germany, the left hand panel of Fig. 5 
shows higher unemployment associated with a depreciating real exchange rate, as would 
be the case in the face of negative aggregate demand shocks. By contrast, a boom in 
aggregate demand in the UK is consistent with the pattern in the right hand panel: falling 
unemployment and an appreciating real exchange rate. A movement from the south-east 
to the north-west in the chart is consistent with stronger aggregate demand (at a given 
real exchange rate) permitting a lower unemployment rate to be maintained because of 
the  associated  rise  in  the  real  wage.  An  important  difference  between  the  UK  and 
Germany is that the sterling exchange rate was floating throughout. Hence part of the 
British adjustment took place rapidly through nominal appreciation around 1997 whereas 
real exchange rate adjustment in the German case (depreciation) took place in a more 
protracted fashion via domestic wage restraint (Fig. 4). By calculating the impact of the   15 
cumulative change in the terms of trade
9, we find that whereas for the UK, a terms of 
trade gain occurred in both periods (6% of GDP in the 1994-1999 period and 3% in the 
2000-2006 period), in Germany there was a gain, although less than one-third that of the 
UK, in the first period, but a loss of 1.3% of GDP in the second. Both countries – along 
with the rest of the OECD – benefited from the underlying trend of falling prices of 
imports from China throughout this period and suffered from rising oil and commodity 
prices from 2004. 
 
 
Figure 5. Unemployment and the Real Exchange Rate, Germany and the UK, 1995-2006 
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Source: OECD Economic Outlook Database 82. 
Notes: The real exchange rate is an index of relative unit labour costs in manufacturing; 2000=100; a rise in 
the index shows a real appreciation. The unemployment rate is the OECD standardized unemployment rate.  
 
Although they can be regarded only as providing indirect evidence, the ex post patterns 
of aggregate demand in the UK and Germany are consistent with demand shocks playing 
an independent role in the evolution of unemployment in the two countries. Fig. 6 shows 
the  ex  post  accounting  contributions  to  the  growth  of  real  GDP  of  household 
consumption and housing; private investment; government consumption and investment; 
and net exports.  
 
                                                 
9 The impact of the terms of trade is measured by multiplying the share of imports in GDP (M/Y, where M 
is Imports of Goods and Services in nominal terms and Y is GDP in nominal terms) by the change in the 
import price deflator relative to the GDP deflator. Source: Calculations using data from OECD Economic 
Outlook 82 Annex Tables and OECD National Accounts Database.    16 
Figure 6. Comparison between Germany and the UK in contributions to growth of 
aggregate demand, 1993-2005 (3 year moving average) 
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Source: OECD National Accounts Database June 2006 
Notes: Contributions to the growth of constant price GDP (3 year moving average). The contributions do 
not add up to GDP growth because of the omission of stock-building, a statistical discrepancy and the 
treatment of government investment in housing.  
 
The superior growth performance of the UK throughout is illustrated in the top chart. In 
the early years, British net exports and investment benefited briefly from the depreciation 
of  the  pound  that  followed  sterling’s  exit  from  the  ERM.  However,  this  was  soon 
replaced by a boom in private consumption and housing, which contributed about 2% p.a. 
to GDP growth throughout the period. In the second half, the growth of demand was 
sustained by strong public spending. This pattern contrasts sharply with the German one, 
where the contribution of private consumption and housing expenditure and government 
spending  declined  throughout  the  period.  Growth  in  the  2000s  was  virtually  entirely 
dependent on net exports. These contrasting patterns are more difficult to reconcile with a 
hypothesis highlighting supply-side problems in Germany: in that case, a given level of 
aggregate demand would be associated with upward inflationary pressure and a tendency 
toward a deterioration rather than improvement of net exports.  
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Interaction between German labour market characteristics and government reforms 
Although primarily directed at freeing up the outsider labour market, it is plausible that 
the government reform programme affected the behaviour of workers in the core labour 
system. Employees with specific skills can be expected to react with particular concern to 
a slowdown in growth, a rise in unemployment and the threat from welfare state reforms 
to unemployment benefits and pensions. For workers with specific skills it will generally 
be harder to find appropriate re-employment if they lose their jobs. Moreover, there is a 
negative externality in a labour market dominated by specific skills. If most of the work 
force has long-term employment, the number of vacancies within a given category of 
employment is likely to be limited; and companies may anyway seek to fill vacancies via 
apprenticeships.  Thus  mid-career  labour  markets  for  many  categories  may  be  quite 
‘illiquid’.
10 The most obvious comparative example of this is with life-time employment 
in  Japan:  in the  relevant  categories,  mid-career  labour  markets  do not  exist,  short  of 
accepting a position in a subsidiary company.  
In Germany as in Japan, illiquidity of mid-career labour markets applies more to the 
relatively highly skilled – since firms have already invested more in them and, since it 
pays companies to invest more in them, they have longer tenure. Less skilled workers, 
but still with apprenticeship certificates, face more open occupational labour markets – 
which are what portable qualifications should equip them to do. Given serious concerns 
about  unemployment  and  with  governmental  pressure  for  welfare  state  reform  in 
unemployment benefits and pensions, those with specific skills who remain employed – 
in fact the great majority – would be expected to respond by supporting company-level 
pacts  for  employment  and  competitiveness  described  above  and  by  building  up 
precautionary and life-cycle savings. Iversen’s (2005) analysis of the guarantor-insurance 
role of the welfare state for those with deep specific skills in a coordinated economy 
explains  why  this  substantial  proportion  of  the  workforce  should  feel  insecure  as  its 
welfare state benefits start to be questioned. Many employees factor in the possibility of 
involuntary  early  retirement  or  part-time  work  from  their  mid-50s  should  economic 
conditions  become  difficult  –  both  schemes  depend  on  welfare  state  provision.  By 
contrast to liberal market economies such as the UK or US where a workforce with more 
general skills could imagine at a similar age responding to economic difficulty by finding 
alternative employment, labour markets for older workers do not exist on any substantial 
scale in Germany.  
The  German  reform  path  did  not  entail  the  adoption  of  family  policies  that  could 
potentially have improved the resilience of consumption by improving the incentives for 
women to participate fully in the labour market. The dramatic growth in the prevalence of 
marginal part-time jobs described in Section 1 has taken place in the context of a tax and 
                                                 
10 Job tenure and job-finding rates differ sharply between Germany on the one hand, and the US and UK, 
on the other. 40% of workers have job tenure of more than ten years in Germany compared with 32% in the 
UK and 26% in the US. Estimated monthly average job-finding rates are 7.0 for Germany as compared 
with 11.3 in the UK and 56.3 in the US. By contrast, estimated monthly job-separation rates are quite 
similar at 1.06 in Germany, 1.53 in the UK and 1.06 in the US. (Hobijn and Sahin, 2007). In both the US 
and Germany there is lower job mobility for skilled than for unskilled workers but the differences in levels 
of mobility are striking: after ten years in the labour market, the average unskilled worker in Germany is in 
their 3.4
th job as compared with 2.8 for a skilled worker. The corresponding numbers for the US are 8.8 and 
5.6 (Cornaglia, 2006).    18 
benefit regime in which spouses acquire access to social security via their husband and 
face a very high marginal tax rate if they exceed a limited number of hours of work. This 
structure undermines the development of a potentially important insurance mechanism 
within the household for families with risk-averse male workers who have specific skills.  
In its review of the pro-cyclical behaviour of consumption in Germany from 2000, the 
Bundesbank noted the role of increased precautionary savings in response both to the 
worries about expected future income from the public pension system and to ‘widespread 
uncertainty  about  the  effects  of  labour  market  reforms’  (2007,  p.  50).  Giavazzi  and 
McMahon (2008) used the natural experiment of the announcement by Chancellor Kohl 
in 1997 of a pension reform and its revocation a year later by Chancellor Schroeder to 
test  for  the  effect  of  reform  uncertainty  on  household  behaviour.  They  found  that 
uncertainty about reforms affecting the future path of incomes rather than reforms per se 
produced a significant rise in precautionary savings.  
 
The  left  panel  of  Fig.  7  shows  the  evolution  of  the  household  savings  ratio  (as  a 
percentage  of  disposable  income)  over  the  period  in  both  countries.  The  pattern  for 
Germany is a shallow U-shape, with the trough at the turn of the century. By contrast, 
there was a dramatic fall in the UK savings rate beginning around 1997. Unlike the US, 
where there was a sharp improvement in productivity growth from the mid 1990s (often 
attributed to the role of information technology), productivity growth in the UK remained 
stable and does not appear to offer an explanation for the decline of the savings rate. The 
role of house prices appears more relevant. Indeed, an important structural difference 
between the two economies over this period that is linked to consumption and savings 
behaviour is the evolution of house prices.
11 House price trends in Germany and the UK 
have been opposite in the past decade: since 1995, real house prices in the UK have risen 
by an annual rate of more than 8% whereas they have fallen by more than 2% p.a. in 
Germany (partly due to the unwinding of the unification construction boom). The right 
hand panel of Fig. 7 illustrates the divergent behaviour of the house price to income ratio 
in the two countries. This difference helped sustain domestic aggregate demand in the 
UK and depress it in Germany. Although a house price bubble eventually bursts, the 
British experience suggests that it can contribute to sustaining buoyant growth over a 
considerable period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 For cross-country empirical evidence demonstrating that there is a strong contemporaneous relationship 
between consumption and housing market wealth, see Case et al., 2005. Their study also reports that the 
impact of changes in housing wealth on consumption is larger and more important than of changes in stock 
market wealth.    19 
 
Figure 7. Household savings ratio and house price to income ratios, UK and Germany 
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Source: Household savings ratio, OECD Economic Outlook 83 Annex Table 23; House price to income 
ratio, OECD Economic Outlook 83 Annex Table 60. 
 
 
Supply-side reforms and aggregate demand: the large economy effect 
The  third  mechanism  suggesting  a  role  for  aggregate  demand  in  accounting  for 
Germany’s poor performance focuses on the implications of supply-side reforms for a 
large economy.  Section 1 argued that the combined impact of private sector restructuring 
and government reforms produced more restrained wage-setting behaviour (at a given 
unemployment rate). This can be depicted in Fig. 8 as a leftward shift of the wage-setting 
curve.  However,  the  implications  of  this  for  unemployment  depend  on  the  balance 
between the impact of lower real wages (improved competitiveness) on net exports and 
investment (via improved profitability) on the one hand, and its depressing effect on 
consumption on the other. This balance will be affected by the size of the economy. For a 
small open economy, reforms that produce a real depreciation will reduce equilibrium 
unemployment (A to C), whereas for a large economy, the impact on consumption may 
outweigh that on net exports, producing a higher level of equilibrium unemployment at 
D.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Household savings ratio 1992-2006, 
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House price to income ratio 1995-2006, 
(100 = long-term average)   20 
Figure 8. Supply-side Reforms: Large and Small-Economy Effects 
Unemployment
Real 
consumption
wage
Initial Wage-setting Curve
U0 ULarge
wSmall
w0
A
C
Restrained Wage-setting Curve
D
wLarge
USmall
Aggregate Demand; Large Economy
Aggregate Demand; Small Economy
Initial Price-setting Curve
Price-setting Curve; Small
Price-setting Curve; Large
 
 
Summing up 
We argued in this section that strong British and weak German economic growth and 
unemployment outcomes in the period since the mid-1990s are not well accounted for by 
an entirely supply-side  hypothesis.  We have suggested that in the open economy the 
presumption that performance over a decade or more must reflect supply-side conditions 
is mitigated by the endogenous response of the real exchange rate to shifts in aggregate 
demand and by the interaction between supply-side improvements and aggregate demand 
in  a  large  economy.  A  positive  aggregate  demand  shock  will  tend  to  produce  a  real 
appreciation, which permits the real wage to rise and a higher level of employment to be 
supported and similarly, a negative shock leads to a real depreciation, which reduces the 
real wage and eliminates falling inflation at higher unemployment. We have shown that 
contrasting patterns of aggregate demand and real exchange rates in Germany and the UK 
are  consistent  with  a hypothesis  in  which  aggregate  demand  shocks  are  important  in 
accounting for the respective performance outcomes.  
 
If  anything,  given  the  characteristics  of  its  labour  market,  the  implementation  and 
announcement  of  supply-side  reforms  in  Germany  may  have  had  the  unintended 
consequence of raising precautionary savings in the core work-force as self-insurance 
substituted for expected lower state insurance reinforcing the depressed level of domestic 
aggregate demand. In the UK there is no core labour market where workers are involved 
with  firms  in  making  co-specific  investments.  Job  turnover  is  higher  in  the  UK  and 
labour market reforms raising the cost of job loss do not affect expectations of life-time 
income in the same way as in Germany. It is also likely that whilst real wage restraint in 
Germany played a role in boosting net exports, its wider effects on aggregate demand in a 
large fairly closed economy  reinforced the weakness of consumption by  keeping real 
income growth low (European Commission, 2006, p. 200, Horn et al., 2008). Country 
economic performance may be affected for quite lengthy periods through the aggregate   21 
demand mechanisms described above. To the extent that these patterns are sustained by 
the build-up of underlying imbalances (e.g. a housing price bubble supporting a rate of 
household  savings  that  is  lower  than  the  long-run  equilibrium  or  an  unsustainable 
deterioration of the current account), reversal will eventually take place.  
A widely cited study published by the European Commission (2002) argued that two-
thirds of the shortfall in German growth relative to the rest of the EU in the 1995-2001 
period was attributable to aggregate demand shocks associated with the after-effects of 
unification. The remainder was ‘unexplained’ and attributed to structural weaknesses in 
the labour market. A more recent Commission modelling exercise (of eurozone countries) 
using a simulated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, reported that ad hoc 
demand shocks had to be introduced to match the data for Germany in the post 2000 
period. The authors note that ‘no particular shock is given to the labour market. The 
demand shocks, especially housing and corporate investment are sufficient to generate a 
decline in the employment rate of the same order of magnitude as observed in the data’ 
(European Commission, 2006, p. 203). Although both of these studies emphasize the role 
of aggregate demand, the associated policy discussion stresses the importance of further 
conventional supply-side reforms. In the next section we suggest possible explanations 
for the absence of activist macroeconomic policy intervention in Germany. 
 
3. Political economic puzzles 
 
Stabilizing macroeconomic policy and coordinated economy institutions 
If  private  sector  demand  shocks  were  an  important  source  of  the  difference  in 
macroeconomic performance between Germany and the UK, the question remains as to 
why stabilizing policy was not implemented in Germany. Macroeconomic policy was 
activist  and  stabilizing  in  the  UK  –  making  use  of  both  monetary  and  fiscal  policy 
instruments to sustain non-inflationary growth. By contrast in Germany from 1999, the 
ECB  could  react  only  partially  to  below  target  German  inflation.  Moreover,  since 
inflation  in  Germany  was  below  the  eurozone  average,  Germany  faced  a  higher  real 
interest rate during a period of growth below the eurozone average. This places more 
weight on the role of fiscal policy. Although attempting to meet the 3% deficit limit of 
the Stability and Growth Pact imparted a pro-cyclical impact to fiscal policy exacerbated 
by the weakness of GDP growth, we argue in this section that fiscal activism in Germany 
may  have  been  constrained for  domestic  political  economy reasons  –  by  the need  to 
sustain incentives for wage restraint by the large wage-setters and by the exigencies of 
coalition government.  
 
There is some evidence that countries divide into groups according to whether activist 
stabilizing fiscal policy is observed (e.g. OECD Economic Outlook 79, 2006, p.32). The 
OECD reports that countercyclical fiscal policy is observed in the ‘other OECD’ group, 
which includes the  Anglo-American economies, and in the small Nordic economies with 
consensual wage-setting institutions. It is absent in the big continental economies with 
large  but  non-encompassing  wage-setters.  A  study  of  the  cyclicality  of  public 
consumption and its components for six OECD countries and the eurozone found that 
Germany showed the strongest pro-cyclical behaviour and that this was more pronounced 
for the series capturing policy-induced dynamics (Lamo et al., 2007). Similar but less   22 
pronounced pro-cyclicality was found for Italy, Spain and France. More mixed results 
and some evidence of counter-cyclicality was found for the UK, US, Sweden, Denmark 
and Japan. 
From a political economy point of view there are two institutional situations that may 
lead to the creation of a conservative framework for the operation of fiscal policy ruling 
out the possibility of the use of discretionary fiscal policy (except perhaps in extreme 
circumstances, as eventually in Japan). The first situation is where there are a limited 
number of powerful wage bargainers who set the inflation rate and de facto the  real 
exchange rate; we shall refer to this as the Small-N case. These powerful unions, usually 
in industrial sectors but also in the public sector, themselves represent a spectrum ranging 
from core highly skilled members in no danger of losing their jobs even with sizeable real 
wage increases to more substitutable employees in more marginally profitable companies 
or industries. If we assume these unions were acting independently (only partly true), and 
that the government was pursuing a discretionary fiscal policy to respond to increased 
unemployment,  then  each  union  is  big  enough  to  believe  that  an  increase  in 
unemployment as a result of its own actions will lead to some offsetting response by the 
government of the order of 1/N. By abandoning discretionary fiscal policy and therefore 
removing this possibility, the government sharpens the incentives for wage moderation.
 12  
This analysis appears relevant to Germany. The coordination of wage bargaining that we 
observe in Germany is an ex-post phenomenon reflecting the understanding of the major 
unions that any one of them is in a position to gain serious real wage increases and in turn 
that this would put pressure on other unions to be more aggressive.
 Given the fear of 
sharp conservative responses to inflation this has led to concerns across the major unions 
and produced the outcome of coordinated restraint. Under EMU where the threat from the 
Bundesbank to punish excessive wage settlements was no longer present, the implication 
is that tougher fiscal policy is required.   
Note that the prospect of discretionary fiscal policy has no effect when labour markets are 
flexible, or if there are a great many independent bargaining units, since no wage-setter 
believes that the tiny increase in unemployment resulting from its own wage bargain will 
change  government  expenditure.  So  neither  the  UK  nor  the  US  with  flexible  labour 
markets should fear the effect of discretionary fiscal policy. Equally, countries such as 
the  Nordic  ones  with  encompassing  wage  bargainers,  or  countries  in  which  all  the 
relevant wage bargainers sit around a table with the government and make a binding 
wage contract should be happy to conduct a flexible fiscal policy. In each of the latter 
cases, the macroeconomic implications of the wage bargain are internalized in the wage-
setting process itself. By contrast in the German (or more generally, small-N case) where 
behaviour is non-cooperative, coordinated wage restraint is elicited by the presence of a 
non-accommodating macroeconomic framework. The classification (e.g. by the OECD) 
of Nordic countries and Germany as ‘high corporatism’ or ‘high coordination’ reflects 
two  distinct  sets  of  institutions,  only  the  latter  of  which  requires  associated  non-
discretionary fiscal policy.    
Second,  the  structure  of  governments  may  affect  the  incentives  for  running  a 
discretionary fiscal policy (Hallerberg et al., 2001). The basic argument is this: coalition 
                                                 
12 Analogous results hold for monetary policy, see Soskice and Iversen (2000).    23 
government leads to a common pool problem if individual ministries with presumably 
different  party  preference  functions  can  independently  decide  on  expenditure  while 
taxation is general. Expenditure will be too high with coalition government. Thus it will 
be in the interest of all the members of the coalition to work out a binding contract 
regarding how much each ministry (or party) should be allowed to spend. For the binding 
contract to work there needs to be a tough fiscal framework. This is likely to be at odds 
with a discretionary approach since there is a principal agent problem: whichever agent 
(say the Minister of Finance) is put in charge of the discretion will incite the concern of 
the principal (the other coalition members) that it is being used to the advantage of the 
Finance  Minister’s  party.  Hence  coalition  governments  will  be  nervous  about 
discretionary fiscal policy. Coalition versus single party government is largely a product 
of  the  electoral  system.  Majoritarian  systems  nearly  always  produce  single  party 
government; proportional representation systems nearly always produce coalitions (or, 
what  are  de  facto  the  same,  minority  governments  with  agreed  support  from  other 
parties).  
Consensual political systems and the nature of reforms 
We noted earlier that coordinated economies have consensus political systems. They are 
characterised  by  proportional  representation,  coalition  government,  strong  opposition 
committee rights and representative parties in which policy positions get negotiated out 
between different interests within the party. Thus different groups are well-entrenched 
politically in these systems, and it takes something like super majorities to bring about 
major changes in their droits acquis. These systems also normally produce centre-left 
coalitions – put crudely because centre parties can do better allying with left or centre-left 
parties and taking resources from higher income groups than they can allying with right 
of centre parties and taking resources from low income groups (Iversen and Soskice, 
2006a). So in principle low income groups are well-represented politically in coordinated 
economies, both because of the general protection of the political system against arbitrary 
or  rapid  change  and  because  of  the  particular  partisan  colour  of  governments.  The 
contrast with the lack of protection that the political system in the UK  gives to low 
income groups is marked: a preponderance of centre-right governments, a leadership-
dominated  Labour  Party  necessarily  focussed  on  the  middle  classes  and  its 
preoccupations  –  toughness on crime  and  good  education  for  their  children  –  to  win 
plurality elections, and the almost complete absence of power of the opposition or other 
groups in parliament.    
 
Given  the  features  of  consensus  political  systems,  it  remains  to  be  explained  how 
orthodox  labour  market  and  welfare state  reforms  that  widen  the income distribution 
gained political support in Germany and why alternative reforms along Nordic lines were 
not  adopted.  For  example,  the  German  authorities  did  not  develop  a  serious,  quasi 
compulsory  cross-sectoral  retraining  programme  to  provide  the  skills  for  those  made 
redundant in industry (typically the less skilled) to be reemployed in services. Part of the 
explanation  rests  on  the  fact  that  unions  and  employer  associations  in  Germany  are 
sectorally based and the powerful industry organisations have little incentive to invest in 
retraining  for  services.  Lower  income  groups  outside  industry  have  limited  union 
representation,  and  thus  there  has  been  less  pressure  for  devoting  resources  to  their 
adequate  retraining.  By  contrast  in  Scandinavia  and  Finland,  there  is  more  effective   24 
cooperation within the union movement across sectors. Nor did German policy-makers 
reform the education system, where children are separated into three different schooling 
tracks at a young age. This makes the acquisition of social skills, including the ability to 
communicate  easily  across  classes,  harder  to  acquire  subsequently.  In  Scandinavia, 
students are at common secondary schools and where tracking occurs, it is much later (at 
age 16 rather than at 10 in Germany). As noted in Section 1, another Nordic reform route 
not taken in Germany relates to the reduction in the costs for women of moving between 
working  at home and in the market. Among  coordinated systems, across all of these 
dimensions, Germany is a thus a more fragmented society than those in Scandinavia and 
Finland.  
 
The German political system fits the consensus description well, but it is exceptional 
among such systems in not having above average centre-left governments in the post 
second world war period. Manow and van Kersbergen explain this by arguing that a 
major  Christian  Democratic  party  with  a  strong  social  wing  to  counterbalance  the 
interests  of  business  has  been  more  attractive  to  middle  class  voters  than  social 
democracy (Manow and van Kersbergen, 2007). The interests of low income groups were 
therefore represented in the social wing of the CDU, as indeed in the CSU, as well as in 
the Social Democratic party. Thus the political move to embrace flexible labour markets 
by weakening protective labour market institutions required an alliance shift that would, 
in  effect,  produce  a  super-majority  that  excluded  low  income  workers  and  the 
unemployed.  
 
Two  broad  sets  of  factors  made  this  easier  than  it  would  have  been  in  the  Nordic 
countries:  the  relative  fragmentation  of  unions  and  the  nature  of  German  political 
partisanship. Unions in Germany were divided both within and among themselves: works 
councils  representing  skilled  workers  had  every  interest  in  flexible  low  level  service 
labour  markets  (even  if  not  expressed  openly)  since  it  implied  cheaper  services  and 
therefore increased the real income for their members, and it implied that their members 
would bear less of the cost of prolonged unemployment; unions directly representing low 
level service sector workers had much less weight than the major industrial unions; and 
the major industrial unions were split between the interests of powerful works councils 
and their own interest in catering for and protecting lower income workers in industry. 
And, pace Manow and van Kersbergen, faced with this major economic/distributional 
crisis, middle class voters in Germany were not pushed towards a centre-left solution that 
protected  low  income  workers  and  the  (typically  low  skilled)  unemployed,  because 
Christian democracy was weighted towards the centre and thus potentially offered an 
alternative solution; this pushed the SPD equally towards the centre if it was to compete 
with the CDU, and the fragmentation within and across the unions made this possible. 
The coalitional realignment was sealed by the fracturing of the left of the SPD and the 
formation of the Left Party. 
 
There is of course a question as to whether this shift in political coalitions – the fracturing 
of social democracy and the similar displacement of the influence of the social wing of 
Christian democracy – is permanent or a temporary consequence of the lengthy period of   25 
poor macro-economic performance. Strong forces within both major political groupings 
are contesting this general shift in policy.   
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Although  the  central  institutions  associated  with  Germany’s  coordinated  economy 
(vocational training, blockholder ownership, collective bargaining and codetermination) 
are still in place, their functioning is more flexible and less encompassing than it was 
earlier. In particular, two major and partially related changes are noticeable. 
 
First, companies and their employees are less solidaristic than they were in relation to the 
wider  organised  business  community  and  industry  unions;  they  are  more  company-
centred,  or  in  Wolfgang  Streeck’s  phrase  ‘betriebsegoistisch’.  As  Thelen  (2007)  has 
pointed out, this shift is reshaping the operation of the vocational training system. And, 
while corporate governance remains based on block shareholdings and capable of taking 
a  long  term  perspective,  financial  globalization  has  had  an  influence,  with  the 
concomitant rise of foreign – typically minority – share-holders. Thus our analysis has 
suggested  that  the  advanced  sectors  of  the  German  economy  have  restructured  using 
private  sector  coordinating  institutions,  which  is  far  from  inconsistent  with  the  co-
alignment of management and employee interests with the long-term profitability of the 
company. In these respects, we may be seeing a shift in the balance of power, common to 
all  coordinated  economies,  away  from  encompassing  labour  organizations  toward 
coordinated company- and sector-based coalitions pushed by financial globalization.  
 
Second,  as  far  as  the  bottom  end  of  the  labour  market  is  concerned,  Germany  has 
developed somewhat differently from most other coordinated economies. Here there has 
been a conscious effort by the German government to create a flexible market for low 
skilled workers in an effort to cope with rising unemployment among this group. While 
flexible labour markets exist to some extent at the bottom end of most countries classified 
as coordinated economies, the phenomenon is especially marked in Germany (Rueda and 
King, 2008). This is reflected in a worsening of the income distribution and growing 
incidence of low-wage work. While inequality has not reached American or British levels 
our  analysis  suggests  that  care  is  needed  in  identifying  coordinated  economies  with 
egalitarian outcomes.  
 
What has caused this development? A major point of this paper is that one cannot analyse 
structural change in economies without bringing in macroeconomics. Macroeconomics 
was central to comparative political economy in the 1970s and 1980s: it was essential in 
the  analysis  of  the  OPEC  and  other  deflationary  shocks  of  the  1970s,  with  sharp 
distinctions between corporatist and other economies in the nature of macroeconomic 
responses. Given the variety of macroeconomic shocks over the past decade and a half –  
from country-specific shocks such as German unification and its aftermath, and house-
price based consumer booms, to the differential country impact of the formation of the 
eurozone and of the growth of the emerging economies – somewhat paradoxically, the 
macroeconomic  dimension  has  dropped  out  of  the  comparative  political  economy  
repertoire (Iversen & Soskice, 2006b).     26 
 
Our argument suggests that macroeconomic factors played a key role in accounting for 
the differential impact of macroeconomic shocks on the Germany economy as compared 
with other coordinated economies. First, unlike other coordinated economies (with the 
notable exception of Japan), Germany is large. Wage restraint is therefore likely to have 
exacerbated the weakness of German aggregate demand with the adverse effect of real 
wage cuts on consumer spending offsetting its beneficial effect via the external balance. 
Second, faced by a small number of powerful wage setters, the German fiscal authorities 
adopted a conservative rather than a discretionary fiscal stance. The government was not 
basically open to deals with unions over expenditure programmes. This contrasts not only 
with the discretionary fiscal stance adopted by liberal market economies with flexible 
labour markets such as the US and the UK (as illustrated in Section 2) but also with inter 
alia Nordic countries with encompassing wage setting arrangements for whom ‘semi-
committed’  collective  understandings  with  the  unions  were  easier.  The  outcome 
(reinforced by the Stability and Growth Pact) was pro-cyclical fiscal policy in contrast 
with its counter-cyclical impact in the liberal and Nordic economies.  
  
Thus initial negative shocks were magnified in one or both of two ways differently from 
other coordinated economies: wage restraint amplified the shock rather than dampening 
it; and fiscal policy tightened in order to hold down the deficit in public spending rather 
than allowing automatic stabilisers to work fully. In addition precautionary savings were 
built up at least in part in response to the concerns about cutbacks in the welfare state 
generated  by  government  policy.  Germany  had  to  face  a  prolonged  period  of  high 
unemployment and depressed growth with the associated heavy costs on the budget.  
 
The  analysis  presented  in  this  paper  suggests  that  Germany  remains  a  coordinated 
economy but, enabled by the reconfiguration of the underlying political coalition, a less 
egalitarian one. This has resulted from the combined impact of the restructuring carried 
out by firms in conjunction with the institutions of the coordinated economy in the core 
economy, the supply-side reforms introduced by the government, and the long period of 
depressed  growth.  The  conventional  analysis  of  German  performance  and  reforms 
assumes that generic labour market reforms can only be beneficial and that barriers to 
their more rapid implementation are the consequence of vested interests or a lack of 
resolve of politicians. By contrast, our argument suggests firstly, that reform design in 
Germany  is  complicated  by  the  continuing  importance  for  its  dynamism  of  the  core 
sectors of the economy that rely on ‘non-standard’ institutions and second, that political 
opposition to reforms that weaken protective labour market institutions is less important 
than often assumed.  
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